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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of the three main channels of international trade on 
domestic innovation, namely outward direct investment (ODI), inward direct 
investment (IDI), and exports. The number of Triadic patents serves as a proxy for 
innovation. The data set contains 37 countries that are considered to be highly 
competitive in the world market, covering the period 1994 to 2005. The empirical 
results show that increased exports and outward direct investment are able to 
stimulate an increase in patent output. In contrast, IDI exhibits a negative relationship 
with domestic patents. The paper shows that the impact of IDI on domestic innovation 
is characterized by two forces, and the positive effects of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions by foreigners is less than the negative effect of the remaining IDI.  
 
 
Keywords: International direct investment, Exports, Imports, Triadic Patent, 
Outward direct investment, Inward direct investment, R&D, negative 
binomial model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Globalization” means different things in different contexts. From an economic 
perspective, it refers to the cross-border movements of goods, funds, personnel and 
information. The more easily do such movements take place, the higher is the degree 
of globalization. In this context, the movement of goods refers to trade, while 
movements of funds refer to international direct investment (Liu et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, based on the direction of the flow of capital, foreign direct investment 
can be broken down into outward direct investment (hereafter ODI) and inward direct 
investment (hereafter IDI).  
According to the World Investment Report by the United Nations and the World 
Development Indicators by the World Bank, in 2008 ODI and exports for the world as 
a whole over the years have generally exhibited an upward trend. Both have 
accounted for an important share of GDP (as shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3), have 
played an essential role in the process of globalization, and have been regarded as the 
main channels for technology spillover. However, international technology spillovers 
can occur through a number of channels: (i) embodied technology can be transmitted 
through international trade (exports and imports) of goods and services, capital flows, 
and mobility of scientists; and (ii) disembodied technology is diffused via 
international trade of technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Geroski et al., 1993, 
Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe et al., 1997, 2009; Keller, 1998, 2004; Kneller, 2005; 
Madsen, 2007; Branstetter, 2006; Liu & Zou, 2008; Mancusi, 2008).  
Furthermore, according to endogenous growth theory, technological innovation is 
important for the “sustained” growth of an economy (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). The 
main reasons for the economic growth of the late-industrializing economies have been 
the acquisition of knowledge and intelligence, technological innovation and human 
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capital accumulation (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Hu & Mathews, 2005; Mueller, 
2006). 
From the above, it can be seen that countries that frequently engage in ODI also 
attract IDI and promote export activities. Such behavior raises the issue as to why 
countries wish to engage in such activities. For this reason, we seek to answer the 
following question: Are ODI, IDI and exports capable of enhancing a country’s 
innovation and technological depth? Conversely, it needs to be asked whether these 
activities can lower a country’s willingness to engage in innovation activities and, 
over the long term, cause the country to lose competitiveness in international markets, 
thereby leading to unsustainable economic growth and eventual recession. 
This paper examines, within the context of globalization, the impact of the three 
main channels of international trade, namely ODI, IDI and exports, on domestic 
innovation, where the number of patents serves as a proxy for innovation. By 
examining the impact between countries of ODI, IDI and exports on patents, the 
results of this paper should serve as a reference for public and private policy. 
Consequently, appropriate international trade policies may be formulated to increase a 
country’s innovation activities, upgrade its industrial technology, and ultimately 
promote economic sustainability and stable growth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review 
of the literature on exports and innovation, and international direct investment and 
innovation. Section III presents the variables, data and sample statistics for the 
empirical analysis. Section IV discusses the research methods. Section V introduces 
the empirical model and analyzes the results. Section VI provides the conclusion and 
some suggestions for further research. 
 
2.  Exports, Imports, International Direct Investment, and Innovation 
5 
Traditional economic theory on the relationship between innovation and exports 
largely focuses on the topic of whether innovation influences exports. For example, 
the technological gap theory (Posner, 1961) and the life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966) 
both argue that innovation will give manufacturers a greater comparative advantage, 
so that they will become net exporters. Moreover, in early studies, the focus was on 
whether a country that is engaged in innovation activities can provide a boost to 
exports (Roper & Love, 2002; Gourlay & Seaton, 2004; Yang et al., 2004; Gourlay et 
al., 2005; Roper et al., 2006; Tomiura, 2007). In contrast, the impact of exports on 
innovation has not yet led to consistent results (Keller, 2009).  
In recent years, studies on these two issues have focused mainly on discussing 
the impact of exports on innovation. For example, Lin & Yeh (2005) found that the 
exports of Taiwan’s electronics industry exhibited a significantly positive relationship 
with that industry’s R&D, but that such a relationship only existed in the case of 
manufacturers engaged in foreign direct investment. For South Korean manufacturers 
as an example, Han & Lee (2007) used the number of patents approved by the U.S. 
Patent Office and the South Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) as the 
explained variables to examine the impact of the export ratio on innovation. Their 
results indicated that the proportion of exports only exhibited a significant and 
positive relationship in regard to those patents approved by the U.S.. It was argued 
that this difference arose because the different strategies adopted by manufacturers in 
applying for patents either at home or abroad.  
The discussion to date has not taken into consideration the possibility that the 
impact of exports on innovation was subject to a time lag. In fact, the impact of 
exports on innovation is likely to have a deferred effect. For example, Salomon & 
Shaver (2005) discovered that for Spanish manufacturers there existed a significant 
and positive relationship between the export behavior of Spanish manufacturers, with 
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a time lag of one or two periods, and the number of products innovated in the 
domestic economy, as well as the number of approved patent applications. Through 
exports, it was possible to acquire knowledge that was lacking in the domestic market, 
and thereby to promote innovation. In other words, the effect of learning by exporting 
was found to exist. In order to verify this learning effect, Girma et al. (2008) analyzed 
manufacturers in the U.K. and Ireland. Their results showed that Irish exports were 
able to increase innovation activities with a time lag of one period, whereas in the 
U.K. there was no compelling evidence to show that exports could increase 
innovation activities. The authors concluded that this difference was due to the 
domestic markets, the sizes of these two countries, and the different destinations of 
their exports. 
Existing empirical evidence also suggests that imports are an important channel 
of international knowledge spillovers (see, for example, Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe 
et al., 1997, 2009; Keller, 1998; Madsen, 2007).  
Coe and Helpman (1995) extended the theories of economic growth that treat 
commercially-oriented innovation efforts as a major engine of technological progress 
depends not only on domestic R&D capital but also on foreign R&D capital. The 
foreign R&D capital was constructed as a weighted sum of the cumulative R&D expenditures 
of the country's trading partners, where the weights are given by the bilateral import shares. Their 
estimates indicate that foreign R&D has beneficial effects on domestic productivity, 
and that these are stronger the more open is an economy to foreign trade.  
Keller (1998) used a Monte Carlo-based robustness test to compare the elasticity 
of domestic productivity with respect to foreign R&D, as estimated by Coe and 
Helpman (1995), with an elasticity based on counterfactual international trade 
patterns. His results show that randomly created trade patterns give rise to positive 
international R&D spillover estimates, which are often larger, and explain more of the 
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variation in productivity across countries, than if "true" bilateral trade patterns were 
employed. Keller’s finding casts doubt on the claim that patterns of international trade 
are important in driving R&D spillovers. 
Madsen (2007) tested whether knowledge has been transmitted internationally 
through imports, and used a dataset on imports of technology and total factor 
productivity (TFP) over 135 years for the OECD countries. The empirical estimates 
show that there is a robust relationship between TFP and imports of knowledge, and 
that 93% of the increase in TFP over the past century has been due solely to imports 
of knowledge.  
Based on Salvatore’s (2007) definition, international direct investment refers to 
real investment engaged in overseas, and includes the acquisition and control of 
factories, capital goods, land, inventory and management. It frequently involves either 
the setting up of overseas subsidiaries or purchasing large quantities of shares in order 
to obtain the right to operate. According to the direction in which the funds for 
investment flow, a distinction may be made between ODI and IDI. Two main types of 
result may be inferred from past empirical studies: in terms of its impact on 
innovation, international direct investment has (1) positive spillover effects, and (2) 
negative or uncertain spillover effects. 
The positive spillover effects refer to the discovery of knowledge spillovers, such 
as technology or management, when engaging in IDI or ODI. This leads to an 
increase in innovation activities in the host country and/or home country. For example, 
Lin & Yeh (2005) interpret IDI and R&D as being mutually dependent, so that if the 
quantity of input of one increases, the amount of expenditure on the other is also 
increased. Blind & Jungmittag (2004) argued that externally-induced competition has 
a training effect on the host country’s domestic market which, in turn, has a positive 
effect on the host country’s innovation activities. However, Lin et al. (2009) adopted a 
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quite different approach to analyzing ODI. They argued that ODI benefits the home 
country’s innovation. Branstetter (2006) also advanced a similar view, and considered 
that international direct investment embodied a feedback effect, so that ODI not only 
caused the innovative behavior of the host country to increase, but also led to a 
positive effect on innovation activities in the home country. 
The negative spillover effect refers to inflows of foreign capital which result in 
the host country becoming excessively dependent on technology, thereby leading to a 
reduction in innovation activities (Kumar, 1987). However, the uncertain spillover 
effect refers to foreign capital impacting the host country’s innovation activities both 
positively and negatively. First, different measurement indicators of IDI are used 
simultaneously, as in Girma et al. (2009), who used the proportion of foreign 
investment and the amount of foreign investment sold domestically as the IDI 
indicator. The empirical evidence showed that the proportion of foreign investment 
has a positive and significant effect on product innovation, while the amount of 
foreign investment is characterized by a significant and negative relationship with 
product innovation.  
Second, different studies have focused on different industries. For instance, 
Deolalikar & Evenson (1989) estimated the patent demand function for India. Their 
empirical results indicated that the higher is the proportion of foreign investment in 
the chemical industry, the lower is the number of patents. In contrast, in light 
engineering and other engineering industries, IDI was found to be positively related to 
patents.  
Finally, various results have also been obtained when international direct 
investment is decomposed into ODI and IDI. For instance, Pottelsberghe & 
Lichtenberg (2001) used a sample of 13 OECD countries to examine whether FDI led 
to a technology transfer effect, and concluded that transfers of technology across 
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borders as part of FDI should not be considered in one direction only. Thus, they 
decomposed FDI into ODI and IDI in order to view capital flows as moving in two 
directions. Their empirical evidence showed that ODI is a technology spillover 
channel that has both a significant and positive effect on the domestic country’s total 
factor productivity. In contrast, IDI did not help to improve the technology of the host 
country, and even adversely affected it. The reason for this was that IDI had a 
tendency to acquire technology from the host country, and then to give this technology, 
which it did not disseminate in its own country (home country), to another country 
(host country). 
Using panel data from 16 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries for the period 1981–2000, Lee (2006) examines the 
relative effectiveness of several channels including inward and outward foreign direct 
investment, imports of intermediate goods, and a disembodied direct channel, as 
measured by technological proximity and patent citations between countries. His 
results indicate international knowledge spillovers through inward FDI and the 
disembodied direct channel are significant and robust. In contrast, outward FDI and 
imports of intermediate goods are not conducive to international knowledge 
spillovers. 
In addition, as the proportion of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (hereafter 
cross-border M&A,) in international direct investment has been increasing annually 
(UNCTAD, 2007), in empirical research the topic of IDI has also been examined 
together with that of cross-border M&A. For example, Liu & Zou (2008) found that 
the significant and positive relationship between cross-border M&A activities in 
China’s high-technology industry and innovation only existed among different 
industries, and that within a particular industry the relationship was positive but not 
significant. The reason for this was that mergers and acquisitions activities may 
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increase the degree of industrial concentration and monopoly power, so that industries 
within the same domestic sector will be characterized by relatively little innovative 
behavior.  
Using a sample of 14 OECD member states, Bertrand & Zuniga (2006) 
examined the relationship between cross-border M&A by foreigners and R&D, and 
their empirical results showed that the overall relationship was positive but not 
significant. By focusing on the industries’ technology intensity, the relationships 
between these mergers and acquisitions activities and R&D for high, medium and low 
levels of technology were found to be negative and not significant, significant and 
positive, and positive and not significant, respectively. Thus, it can be seen that the 
significant and positive relationship between cross-border M&A by foreigners and 
innovation exists only in the local context. 
     
3. Data  
 
This paper uses panel data for 37 countries covering the period 1994 to 2005. 
There are three criteria for selecting the sample, as follows: (1) globalization, (2) 
OECD member states, and (3) upper-middle or high income countries. The reason for 
using these three criteria is that the emphasis in this paper is on globalization, so that 
the most important economies on the five continents, namely Europe, Asia, America, 
Oceania and Africa, are included in the sample. Second, the motivation for including 
the OECD countries in the sample is that more than 90% of the world’s foreign direct 
investment originates in OECD countries (Ou Yang & Hwang, 2006), so that the vast 
majority of OECD countries are engaged in cross-border direct investment activities. 
Finally, the reason for selecting upper-middle or high income countries is that when 
relatively high income countries are compared with low income countries, the higher 
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income countries will tend to engage in R&D activities, and will attach greater 
importance to patents, which are the embodiment of intellectual property rights.  
As shown in Table 1, the sample is subdivided into continents, with 22 countries 
in Europe, eight countries in Asia, four countries in the Americas, two countries in 
Oceania, and one country in Africa. Second, as shown in Table 2, there are 28 OECD 
member countries and nine countries that are not members of the OECD. Finally, 
when countries are categorized according to the World Bank’s income classification, 
28 countries are high income countries, eight are upper-middle income countries, and 
one country is a low-middle income country
1
. The only low-income country is China. 
As China has a significant influence on the world economy, and as one of the main 
countries into which foreign capital flows, in discussing the topic of globalization the 
Chinese economy should be incorporated into the sample. Overall, the sample 
comprises advanced countries, that is, a highly competitive group of countries in the 
world market that encompasses the world’s major economies on all five continents. 
Although we do not examine each country in the world in detail, the sample serves as 
a basis for discussing the topic of globalization in the broader sense. 
    In addition, the data for all the variables are obtained primarily from three 
sources: OECD’s Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI) for 2007, the 
United Nations’ World Investment Report (hereafter WIR) published in 2008, and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (hereafter WDI), also published in 2008. 
Due to the omission of data on Singapore’s exports (for which the data were not 
available from 1994 to 2000), the data for Singapore’s exports were obtained from the 
Singapore Trade Development Board. In addition, as Taiwan is not included in the 
above publications, the data for Taiwan were obtained from the Directorate-General 
                                                     
1
 According to the World Bank’s income classification, income can be subdivided into the following 
four levels: high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low. 
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of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan.  
This paper uses patents as a proxy for innovation, as shown in Table 3. In 
selecting the number of patents, previous studies have frequently used the number of 
approved patent applications submitted to a specific patent office as the innovation 
index (Branstetter, 2006; Deolalikar & Evenson, 1989). Alternatively, they have used 
the “corresponding” numbers of patents applied for to the patent offices of two 
countries to represent this number, and thereby facilitate a comparison (Han & Lee, 
2007).  
In this paper, it is argued that comparing the differences in innovation output 
between countries will lead to bias, due to the host country’s home advantage, if only 
the applications for approved patents by a single patent office are used. When an 
inventor applies for a patent, as compared with applying to a patent office in another 
country, they are more likely to prefer applying to their own country’s patent office 
for a patent. For this reason, we use a triadic patent that is based on approved 
“simultaneous” applications by patent offices in Europe, USA and Japan as an 
appropriate indicator. In this way, we can reduce the bias that is generated due to the 
host country’s home advantage.  
In addition, as a patent is the outcome of innovation, if we can presume that a 
higher economic value of an innovation is implied by a triadic patent, the greater will 
the patent be able to reflect economic growth. In addition, this paper uses patents 
applied for in one direction to the European patent office, that is, unilateral patents, so 
that we can further compare whether differences in the numbers of patents are 
significant in relation to the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
Patents are used as a proxy for domestic innovation. However, it is well known 
that patents are not an ideal proxy for innovation output as: (i) not all innovation 
outputs are patented or patentable; and (ii) patents may be filed for the purpose of 
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deterring entry other than protecting invention. The use of the more restrictive triadic 
patents may further reduce the ability of patents to proxy innovation.  
Exports and international direct investment constitute the main channel of 
technology spillover among countries (Branstetter, 2006; Liu & Zou, 2008). Of these, 
international direct investment is bidirectional, and can be divided into ODI and IDI 
(Pottelsberghe & Lichtenberg, 2001). Meanwhile, based on the definition provided in 
the WIR for 2008, Foreign Direct Investment comprises three parts, namely, equity 
capital,
2
 reinvested earnings,
3
 and intra-company loans.
4
 Thus, we further 
decompose IDI into two parts, namely cross-border M&A by foreigners, and other 
direct investment.  
In addition, R&D activities require inputs over a long period of time to produce 
results, the inputs in the current period will be separated from the benefits not yet seen 
by a time lag extending to future periods (Tsou & Liu, 1997). For this reason, the lag 
of R&D is taken into consideration (Han & Lee, 2007). The above explanatory 
variables are shown in Table 3. As the sample includes data for 37 countries, to 
remove differences in the amounts expended on R&D varying from country to 
country, all of the explanatory variables are divided by their own-country GDP. 
    From Table 4, which gives the descriptive statistics for the empirical variables, 
three phenomena may be observed. First, regardless of whether the triadic patent 
(TRI_PATENT) or the unilateral patent (EPO_PATENT) is used, the respective 
standard deviations are both twice as large as their means. From this, we see that the 
patent information is characterized by over-dispersion. Second, by adding the means 
                                                     
2
 This refers to shares of companies bought by foreign direct investors outside the countries in which 
they reside. 
3
 This refers to the portion of the surplus on the direct investors’ investments that is retained and used 
for reinvestment. 
4
 This refers to the loans in the form of short-term or long-term funds between direct investors and 
affiliated companies.  
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of total exports (EXP) and ODI, their combined share of GDP exceeds 40 percent 
(0.3896 + 0.0254 = 0.415). In other words, exports and ODI together account for a 
high proportion of international trade. Third, with cross-border M&A by foreigners 
(M & A_SALE) accounting for more than one-half of IDI (0.0176 / 0.0325 = 0.54), it 
is clear that cross-border M&A are the main component of international direct 
investment.  
 
4. Models 
 
4.1 Negative binomial model 
 
As a patent is a non-negative discrete variable, this paper uses the count data 
model. The two types of count data model commonly used are the Poisson model and 
the Negative binomial model. The Poisson model’s probability density function is 
given in equation (1), where ity  is the number of patents in country i  in year t , 
and
 it
  is the average number of patents in country i  in year t , namely the unit 
frequency of approved patent applications. In this model, the mean and variance are 
equal, as shown in equation (2). However, in empirical research, patent data are often 
characterized by over dispersion (Aggarwal, 2004), that is, the variance is greater than 
the mean. Thus, the Poisson model may be inappropriate, so that the negative 
binomial model is commonly used to resolve the shortcomings of the Poisson model:  
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According to Hausman et al. (1984), the negative binomial model, which has 
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individual and unobserved effects, generalizes the Poisson model. It assumes that the 
Poisson model parameter, it , conforms to a Gamma   ,it  distribution, where   
does not change across countries or over time. The basic negative binomial model is 
given in equation (3) (for a detailed derivation, see Hausman et al. (1984)): 
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The negative binomial model relaxes the assumption in the Poisson model that 
the mean and variance are equal, so that it allows the number of patents to be 
characterized by over dispersion, as in (4): 
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As this paper uses panel data, we can use the fixed effects and random effects 
models, each of which is explained below. 
 
4.2 Fixed effects negative binomial model 
 
First, we configure the model parameters,
 it
  and i , as shown in equations 
(5)-(8) below: 
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where ity  is the number of patents in country i  in year t , it  is the expected 
value of ity , itX  denotes the explanatory variables,   is a parameter to be 
estimated, and i  is the fixed effect of an individual country i  that does not change 
over time.     
Under the conditions of the sum of the patents, t ity , the conditional 
probability density function of
 
 itii yyy , ... ,1  is given in equation (9). From 
equation (10), it can be seen that the variance is greater than the mean, so that this 
model allows the explained variable to be characterized by over dispersion: 
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Finally, we can derive the likelihood function, as shown in equation (11). After 
itX
it eγ
   is substituted, maximum likelihood estimation can be used to obtain 
estimates of the parameters:  
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4.3 Random effects negative binomial model 
 
The steps for inferring the random effects model are essentially the same as those 
for the fixed effects model discussed above. It is necessary to configure the 
parameters,
 it
  and i , as shown in equations (12)-(15). The difference from the 
fixed effects model is that the random effects model assumes that i  is randomly 
distributed, in which case the joint probability density function for  itii yyy , ... ,1  
and i  
is given in equation (16) below: 
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    In order to obtain the probability density function of iy , it is necessary to use 
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integration to remove i  from the joint probability density function. For this reason, 
it is necessary to select an appropriate distribution for i , as shown in equation (17), 
where iz  conforms to a Beta ( ba  , ) distribution. The probability density function is 
given in equation (18): 
i
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  111 )1(),()(   bai zzbaBzf        (18) 
Through substitution of the above conditions and using integration, we can 
obtain the probability density function of
 i
y , as shown in equation (19), and obtain 
its likelihood function, as in equation (20). After it
X
it eγ
   is substituted, by using 
maximum likelihood estimation, we can obtain the estimates of the parameters: 
 
 
 
   
    ii
y
ii
itit
itit
T
t
i dzzfzz
y
y
yPr itit   1
1 
 
1
0
1









  




 
     
     
 
   









 
 

1 
          
itit
itit
titit
itit
yΓγΓ
yγΓ
ybaba
ybaba


    (19) 
 
         
          












i
t
itititititit
itit
yΓγΓyγΓyba
baybaba
L
1lnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnln
ln


(20) 
 
Model 1 in this paper examines the impact of exports, imports, ODI, IDI and 
R&D expenditure, using a time lag of one period on triadic patents, with the empirical 
model given in equation (21). In (21), it  represents the expected value of the triadic 
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patent, itEXP  denotes exports, itEXP  itIM denotes imports, itODI  is outward direct 
investment, itIDI  is inward direct investment, itGERDL _1  is domestic R&D 
expenditure, with a time lag of one period,
 it
  is the error term, and 1 , 2 , 3  
4 and 7  
are the unknown parameters associated with the explanatory variables: 
Model 1 
 )_1( 74321 ititititititit GERDLIDIODIIMEXPexpγ     
                
(21) 
  As the proportion of cross-border M&A in international direct investment increases 
annually (see UNCTAD, 2007), we decompose inward direct investment (IDI) into 
cross-border M&A by foreigners and other direct investment, with a view to 
examining the impact of these two forces on triadic patents. The empirical model is 
given in Model 2, equation (22), where itMA denotes cross-border M&A by foreigners, 
itPRIVATE  is other direct investment, it , itEXP , itIM , itODI , itGERDL _1  and 
it  
are as defined above, and 1 , 2 , 5 , 6  and 7  
are the unknown 
parameters: 
Model 2 
)_1( 765321 itititititititit GERDLPRIVATEMAODIIMEXPexpγ  
(22) 
In order to make the empirical results reflect more accurately the source of most 
R&D expenditure, we change the data on R&D expenditure from total domestic R&D 
expenditure (GERD) to R&D expenditure for the domestic business sector (BERD). 
The empirical model is given in Model 3, equation (23), where itBERDL _1  
represents R&D expenditure in the domestic business sector, with a time lag of one 
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period. The definitions of the rest of the variables are as described above, and 1 , 
2 , 5 , 6  and 7  
 are the unknown parameters: 
Model 3 
)_1( 765321 itititititititit BERDLPRIVATEMAODIIMEXPexpγ  
 (23) 
   
 
Finally, the patent data are changed from triadic patents to unilateral patents, and the 
empirical model is given in Model 4, equation (24), where
 it
  represents the 
expected values of the unilateral patents, the definitions of the remaining variables are 
as described above, and 1 , 2 , 4 , 5  and 6  are the parameters: 
Model 4 
)_1( 765321 ititititititit GERDLPRIVATEMAODIIMEXPexp  
 
(24) 
In Models (1)-(4), ODI and IDI (or its decomposition) may be endogenous 
because they may be correlated with a country's productivity level and technological 
development. In order to eliminate the endogeneity issue, we use lagged EXP, lagged 
IM, lagged ODI and lagged IDI as the lagged R&D expenditures in Models 1-4. 
However, in order to include the country-level characteristics, all explanatory 
variables in Models 1-4 have been divided by GDP. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, to eliminate the endogeneity problem, the 
empirical version of Model 1 examines the impact of five variables, namely lagged 
exports, lagged imports, lagged ODI, lagged IDI and lagged R&D expenditure on 
patents. In order to maintain consistency, it is necessary to determine the number of 
periods for which R&D expenditure is deferred in order to establish Model 1. In order 
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to enhance efficiency in estimation, we use bootstrapping methods to estimate the 
variances. Tables 5-10 report the t-values both with and without bootstrapping. 
Table 5 reports the results of determining the number of periods by which the 
R&D expenditure should be deferred using the negative binomial model based on 
both fixed and random effects. The empirical results indicate that the influence of 
R&D expenditure deferred one period improves explanatory power. The finding that 
the impact of the R&D input on patents has a one-period lag effect is consistent with 
that of Tsou & Liu (1997). For this reason, in the subsequent discussion, R&D 
expenditure deferred one period (L1_GERD) will serve as the R&D expenditure 
variable, such that columns (2) and (6) in Table 5 will be Model 1.  
    In Table 6, we test the model using the Hausman test, with the null hypothesis as 
the random effects model, and the alternative hypothesis as the fixed effects model. 
As the test does not reject the null hypothesis, the subsequent analysis is explained 
using the random effects model.
5
 From Model 1, we can draw the following 
conclusions:  
(i) Exports deferred one period (L1_EXP) exhibit a significant positive 
relationship with patents at the 1% level. This result explains the strong 
competition facing world markets. For a country’s exporters to gain a 
foothold in international markets, it is necessary to improve the quality of 
their exports. For this reason, they have an incentive to engage in R&D, 
and to apply for patents to protect their innovations, thereby enhancing 
their export competitiveness.  
(ii) Outward direct investment deferred one period (L1_ODI) also exhibits a 
significant and positive relationship with patents at the 1% level. This 
                                                     
5
 Although this paper discusses the random effects model, each of the tables also lists the results for 
the fixed effects model. 
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suggests that a country that is engaged in ODI is able to access knowledge, 
technology and other additional products from the host country, import this 
to the home country, to engage in innovative R&D to enhance the level of 
technology, and in turn apply for a patent. In contrast, inward direct 
investment by foreigners deferred one period (L1_IDI) exhibits a negative, 
though insignificant, relationship with the home country’s patents. This 
indicates that inflows of foreign investment not only do not positively 
benefit the innovation in the home country, but negatively impacts it 
instead. The results of the impact of the two-way direct investment (ODI 
and IDI) effect on innovation are consistent with the conclusion reached 
by Pottelsberghe & Lichtenberg (2001).  
(iii) Domestic R&D expenditure with a lag of one period (L1_GERD) exhibits 
a positive relationship with the patent at the 9% level. The results suggest 
that further discussion on this issue is required, as R&D expenditure and 
patents are innovative inputs and outputs, and hence should be 
characterized by a highly significant relationship. For this reason, we 
discuss this issue at greater length below.  
(iv) By comparing three behavioural coefficients, namely exports, ODI and 
R&D expenditure, that can be determined in the home country, it is found 
that the impacts of all three coefficients on patents, from the largest to the 
smallest, are as follows: R&D expenditure (9.362), exports (1.628), and 
ODI (1.521). 
 Table 7 presents the empirical results for Model 2, wherein IDI is decomposed 
into cross-border M&A (M&A), and other direct investment by foreigners (PRIVATE), 
and the impact of each on patents is then tested. The empirical results are presented in 
Table 7, with the following conclusions:  
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(i) the relationships and significance between L1_exports, L1_ODI, 
L1_GERD and patents are all consistent with the results of Model 1;  
(ii) cross-border M&A by foreigners deferred one period (L1_M&A) exhibit a 
negative but insignificant relationship with the patents.  
This result is similar to that of Bertrand & Zuniga (2006), who use 14 OECD 
member countries in their sample. Other direct investment (L1_PRIVATE) has a 
negative but insignificant relationship with patents. From these two impacts on 
patents, one negative and one positive, we can indirectly explain why IDI exhibits a 
negative but insignificant relationship on patents. The reason is that the negative 
effect of other direct investment on patents is stronger than the positive effect on 
patents of cross-border M&A by foreigners. In other words, inflows of foreign capital, 
in general, are of little or no benefit to domestic innovation. However, if these inflows 
are decomposed into two parts, namely cross-border M&A by foreigners and other 
direct investment, then there is only a limited positive effect on innovation. 
 The results of Model 1 show that R&D expenditure does not have a significant 
impact on patents, so we now examine the innovation inputs and outputs, as 
represented by R&D expenditure and patent data. First, we change the R&D 
expenditure data from the overall domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) used in Model 
1 into the domestic business sector R&D expenditure (BERD), and examine whether 
this replacement is able to change the significance of R&D expenditure on patents. By 
comparing columns (2) and (4) in Table 8, it can be seen that, in the random effects 
model, R&D expenditure with a lag of one period is still not significant for patents, 
but the estimated coefficients are significantly different from each other.
6
 Second, the 
patent data based on triadic patents (TRI_PATENT) are replaced with data based on 
                                                     
6
 Based on the random effects model, the L1_GERD coefficient has a value of 10.244, and the 
L1_BERD coefficient a value of 15.235.  
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unilateral patents (EPO_PATENT). From columns (6) and (8) in Table 9, it can be 
seen from the random effects model that the significance of the three explanatory 
variables, namely R&D expenditure lagged one period, other direct deferred one 
period (L1_PRIVATE) investment, and cross-border M&A by foreigners deferred one 
period (L1_M&A), markedly increases for unilateral patents when compared with that 
for triadic patents. For the first two variables, this significance increases from the 5% 
to the 1% level. In the case of cross-border M&A by foreigners, this significance 
increases less markedly to the 5% level.  
Thus, it can be seen that the differences in the patent data differ markedly in 
relation to the significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. In other 
words, when comparing the results of innovation across countries, the selection of 
patents is important. Taking the present paper as an example, because the sample 
encompasses five continents, if unilateral patents are used as the innovation indicator, 
such a choice is clearly not objective and can lead to bias. Thus, it is suggested that 
using the triadic patent as a proxy for innovation is more appropriate. 
 The empirical results above have shown that inflows of foreign capital are of 
little or no benefit to domestic innovation, but instead lead to a negative impact. In 
contrast, by engaging in autonomous behaviour through exports, ODI and R&D, it is 
possible to promote innovation activities domestically. In order that excessive reliance 
and expectations are not placed on inflows of foreign capital, the best policy for the 
promotion of innovation is to maintain a firm grasp on the domestic country’s affairs. 
It is only in this way that the level of technology can be enhanced, technical standards 
upgraded, and ultimately the promotion of economic growth sustained. 
The reason why inventors apply for patents is to protect their innovations. 
However, behind the results of innovation, there is usually a perceived economic 
value. The higher is this economic value, the greater is the incentive for these 
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inventors to apply simultaneously for patents in different countries. From the 
definitions of the variables described above, triadic patents represent approved 
simultaneous applications for patents in Europe, USA and Japan, while unilateral 
patents refer to approved applications for patents made to the European patent office. 
For this reason, it can be assumed that triadic patents are superior to unilateral patents 
in terms of representing economic benefits.  
Columns (5) and (7) in Table 9 present the regression results in relation to triadic 
and unilateral patents, and these lead to the following results. The first phenomenon is 
that the contribution of ODI to products of low economic value in the home country is 
greater than that of products of high economic value. We propose two possible 
reasons. First, although the ODI results that obtaining factors, such as technology and 
knowledge, are helpful to the home country’s innovation, individuals are nevertheless 
rational, as are countries. For this reason, the host country will retain a number of key 
innovation factors (products with relatively high economic value), so that it will not 
be easy to obtain technology in relation to ODI that has a correspondingly high 
economic value. Second, the samples used in this paper are primarily for developed 
countries, with upper-middle levels of income or higher, and the bids for ODI for the 
countries sampled are mostly directed towards countries with levels of technology 
that are lower than their own. Thus, the level of technology that can be obtained is 
limited, so that it is not easy to obtain technology with a high economic value.  
The second phenomenon is that the impact of IDI on the absolute value of the 
coefficient of the triadic patent coefficient is greater than the absolute value of the 
coefficient of the unilateral patent.
7
 That is, the harm done to the host country’s 
products of high economic value is greater than that to its products of low economic 
                                                     
7
 As IDI has a negative relationship with patents, our goal is to compare which of the two impacts of 
IDI on triadic and unilateral patents has the greater influence. The existence of a negative value will 
influence the results, and so it is necessary to use absolute values.  
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value. This paper proposes two possible reasons for this phenomenon. In relation to 
foreign investment, the inflows of such investment into the domestic country will not 
only generate substantial economic profits, but will also result in some factors being 
obtained that can help domestic innovation. The more important are these innovation 
factors, the better, that is, the greater is the economic value of the products, the better. 
For this reason, the harm done to the domestic country’s products of high economic 
value will be greater. 
Finally, in order to verify the two observed phenomena discussed above, we 
change the R&D expenditure variable from total domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) 
to domestic business sector R&D expenditure (BERD). We test the differences 
between these R&D expenditure variables in order to examine whether we can obtain 
the same phenomena. The empirical results presented in columns (5) and (7) in Table 
10 suggest that the above two phenomena still exist, so that, regardless of whether 
GERD or BERD is used for R&D expenditure:  
(1) the contribution of ODI to the domestic country’s products of low economic 
value is greater than to products of high economic value; and  
(2) the harm caused by IDI to the domestic country’s products of high economic 
value is greater than to products of low economic value.     
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In this paper, we used panel data for 37 countries for the period 1994 to 2005, 
and performed an empirical analysis using a negative binomial model. The main 
purpose was to examine the impact of the two main technology spillover channels, 
namely international direct investment (IDI) and exports on innovation. IDI was 
decomposed into outward direct investment (ODI) and inward direct investment (IDI) 
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based on the direction of capital flows, and because of the increasing importance over 
the years of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (cross-border M&A) by foreigners. 
For these reasons, we decomposed inward direct investment into cross-border M&A 
by foreigners and other direct investment. In addition, as R&D expenditure and 
patents are innovation inputs and outputs, we also included R&D expenditure in the 
model as an explanatory variable. Moreover, among the dependent variables, we used 
the number of patents as a proxy for innovation, and also used data on both triadic and 
unilateral patents. 
In summary, within the context of globalization, this paper investigated the 
impact of exports, imports, ODI, IDI, cross-border M&A by foreigners and R&D 
expenditure on the number of patents for 37 countries that are considered to be highly 
competitive in world markets. Based on the empirical results, we can draw the 
following conclusions: 
1. Among the main channels of international trade, exports and ODI exhibited a 
positive relationship with the domestic country’s patents, that is, increased 
exports and ODI are able to stimulate an increase in patent output. In contrast, 
IDI exhibits a negative relationship with domestic patents.  
2. R&D expenditure deferred one period has a significant and positive impact on 
the number of patents, which explains the deferred nature of the impact of the 
R&D input on the patents. The input in the current period will only exhibit a 
significant outcome in the following period. 
3. Imports are found not to have a significant effect on technology spillovers. 
4. Differences in patent data can lead to substantial differences in the estimated 
results.  
Finally, when comparing the results of innovation among countries within the 
framework of globalization, if unilateral patents are used as the dependent variable, 
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the results obtained are likely to be much improved. However, it is also likely that, 
because of the presence of a host country’s advantage, the empirical estimates are 
likely to be biased. Thus, it is necessary to use triadic patents as a proxy for 
innovation as they are the more appropriate variable, and also closer to the actual 
innovation results for each country. 
In an era of globalization, although countries are frequently engaged in exchange 
with each other, each government has sought to attract foreign investment, and has 
been wary of outflows of capital from the domestic economy. However, the empirical 
results indicate that the competitive behaviour between countries is similarly rational 
and individualistic, so that inflows of foreign capital are of little or no benefit to 
domestic innovation, and instead can lead to a negative impact.  
In contrast, countries that engage in autonomous behaviour related to exports, 
ODI and R&D input are then able to encourage innovation activities. In other words, 
there are not excessive expectations of, or reliance on, inflows of foreign funds from 
abroad, so that inflows of foreign capital may contribute to a country’s GDP in the 
short term. However, when viewed from a long-term perspective, the key to sustained 
and stable economic growth is still innovation, and the promotion of such innovation 
must still be grasped. Only in this way can the level of technology be raised and the 
sustained growth of the economy ultimately enhanced. 
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Table 1. OECD Countries  
 Europe Asia Americas Oceania Africa 
 
Country 
United Kingdom, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Norway, Slovenia, 
Poland, Romania 
Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, 
Israel, Turkey, 
Taiwan, 
Russian 
Federation, 
China 
USA, 
Canada, 
Mexico, 
Argentina 
Australia, 
New 
Zealand,  
South 
Africa 
Total  22 8 4 2 1 
 
 
Table 2. OECD Countries by Income 
Income Level OECD Member Non-OECD Member  Total  
High   25
a
 3
b
 28 
Upper-Middle   3
c
 5
d
 8 
Lower-Middle  0 1
e
 1 
Total  28 9 37 
Source: World Bank  
Notes: a: United Kingdom, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Norway, Japan, Korea, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia; b: 
Slovenia, Singapore, Israel; c: Poland, Turkey, Mexico; d: Romania, Taiwan, Russian 
Federation, Argentina, South Africa; e: China 
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Table 3. The Variables 
Dependent Variable 
TRI_PATENT Triadic Patent
a
 Number of triadic patent families. 
(i.e. A patent is filed at the EPO, the 
JPO and is granted by the USPTO. 
EPO_PATENT European Patent Office 
Patent
b
 
Number of patent applications 
approved by the EPO
c
. 
Independent Variable 
EXP Export Ratio of Export divided by GDP
 
IM Import Ratio of Import divided by GDP 
ODI Outward Direct Investment Ratio of ODI divided by GDP
 
IDI Inward Direct Investment Ratio of IDI divided by GDP
 
M&A_SALE Inward Cross-Border M&A Ratio of Inward Cross-Border M&A 
divided by GDP
 PRIVATE Other Direct Investment Variable “IDI” minus Variable 
“M&A_SALE”
 GERD Gross Domestic Expenditure 
on R&D 
Ratio of Gross Domestic 
Expenditure on R&D by GDP
 BERD Expenditure on R&D in the 
Business Enterprise Sector 
Ratio of Expenditure on R&D in the 
Business Enterprise Sector by GDP
 L0, L1, L2, L3 Three-year time lag: Current, 
one year, two year and three 
year time lag in sequence 
 
Note:  
a: It’s the main dependent variable, provided with the intention of improving international 
comparability (the home advantage is suppressed, the values of the patents are more 
homogeneous) (OECD, 2007).  
b: the minor dependent variable that compared to the triadic patent. 
c: The European Patent Office provides a uniform application procedure for individual 
inventors and companies seeking patent protection in up to 40 European countries, and is 
the executive arm of the European Patent Organization. The European Patent Organization 
is an intergovernmental organization that was set up on 1977 on the basis of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) signed in Munich in 1973. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Error Min. Max. 
TRI_PATENT 1184.12 3182.04 0.0000 16368 
EPO_PATENT 2644.45 6031.13 3.0000 32064 
EXP 0.3896 0.2490 0.0752 1.9006 
IM 0.3778 0.2325 0.0707 1.6554 
ODI 0.0254 0.0415 -0.0497 0.4351 
IDI 0.0325 0.0410 -0.1578 0.2675 
M&A_SALE 0.0176 0.0236 0.0000 0.2321 
PRIVATE 0.0149 0.0348 -0.1698 0.2130 
L1_GERD 0.0202 0.0101 0.0046 0.0662 
L1_BERD 0.0122 0.0081 0.0012 0.0498 
Note: The only country with a zero value for TRI-Patent is Romania.
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Table 5. Lag Structure of R&D 
TRI_ 
PATENT 
Fixed Effects Random Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXP 1.636 
(2.27)** 
[4.30]*** 
1.273 
(1.77)* 
[3.24]*** 
0.845 
(0.69) 
[2.06]** 
0.086 
(0.11) 
[0.19] 
1.684 
(2.28)** 
[4.38]*** 
1.350 
(1.86)* 
[3.39]*** 
0.959 
(0.83) 
[2.31]** 
0.249 
(0.28) 
[0.54] 
IM -0.045 
(-0.04) 
[-0.10] 
0.365 
(0.30) 
[0.72] 
0.862 
(0.54) 
[1.56] 
1.747 
(1.95)* 
[2.78]*** 
-0.181 
(-0.15) 
[-0.39] 
0.180 
(0.15) 
[0.36] 
0.615 
(0.41) 
[1.11] 
1.419 
(1.62) 
[2.26]** 
ODI 
 
1.411 
(2.89)*** 
[2.93]*** 
1.336 
(3.13)*** 
[2.91]*** 
1.088 
(2.23)** 
[2.43]** 
0.897 
(1.93)* 
[2.08]** 
1.454 
(3.10)*** 
[3.01]*** 
1.389 
(3.14)*** 
[3.01]*** 
1.142 
(2.37)** 
[2.54]** 
0.944 
(2.03)** 
[2.18]** 
IDI -0.909 
(-1.20) 
[-1.91]* 
-0.881 
(-1.61) 
[-1.95]* 
-0.776 
(-1.20) 
[-1.79]* 
-0.830 
(-1.87)* 
[-1.97]** 
-0.927 
(-1.21) 
[-1.93]* 
-0.893 
(-1.54) 
[-1.95]* 
-0.771 
(-1.27) 
[-1.76]* 
-0.797 
(-1.85)* 
[-1.86]* 
L0_GERD 11.725 
(1.33) 
[3.54]*** 
 
 
 
 
 12.204 
(1.34) 
[3.71]*** 
 
 
  
L1_GERD 
 
 10.144 
(1.42) 
[3.26]*** 
   10.640 
(1.49) 
[3.44]*** 
  
L2_GERD   7.171 
(1.21) 
[2.41]** 
   7.750 
(1.20) 
[2.62]*** 
 
L3_GERD 
 
   5.221 
(0.92) 
[1.77]* 
   5.931 
(1.10) 
[2.03]** 
CONSTANTS 
 
1.614 
(2.45)** 
[12.91]*** 
1.812 
(2.39)** 
[14.21]*** 
2.020 
(2.13)** 
[15.46]*** 
2.237 
(1.78)* 
[16.32]*** 
1.626 
(2.45)** 
[13.08]*** 
1.828 
(2.38)** 
[14.41]*** 
2.040 
(2.21)** 
[15.70]*** 
2.262 
(1.83)* 
[16.60]*** 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1967.3 
42.53 
-1769.7 
33.98 
-1577.0 
10.74 
-1383.5 
12.28 
-2316.8 
41.94 
-2117.5 
30.53 
-1922.9 
10.18 
-1727.1 
12.85 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.025 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
440 
37 
403 
37 
366 
37 
329 
37 
440 
37 
403 
37 
366 
37 
329 
Note: Bootstrapping t-statistics are in the parentheses and t-statistics without 
bootstrapping appear in square brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Model 1 
TRI_PATENT Fixed Effects Random Effects 
L1_EXP 
1.596 
(1.81)* 
[3.87]*** 
1.628 
(1.86)* 
[3.90]*** 
L1_IM 
-0.263 
(-0.19) 
[-0.56] 
-0.377 
(-0.28) 
[-0.80] 
L1_ODI 
1.465 
(3.73)*** 
[2.60]*** 
1.521 
(3.79)*** 
[2.69]*** 
L1_IDI 
-0.993 
(-1.46) 
[-1.81]* 
-1.023 
(-1.44) 
[-1.85]* 
L1_GERD 
8.898 
(0.94) 
[2.60]*** 
9.362 
(1.05) 
[2.75]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.894 
(2.51)** 
[14.44]*** 
1.905 
(2.54)** 
[14.59]*** 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1778.5 
28.32 
-2125.7 
26.48 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
Hausman test (Prob chi2)  -3.70 
Note: Bootstrapping t-statistics are in the parentheses and t-statistics without 
bootstrapping appear in square brackets. The asterisks *** and * denote significance 
at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Model 2 - Decomposition of IDI 
TRI_PATENT Fixed Effects Random Effects 
L1_EXP 
1.608 
(1.87)* 
[3.87]*** 
1.638 
(1.87)* 
[3.89]*** 
L1_IM 
-0.264 
(-0.19) 
[-0.56] 
-0.377 
(-0.28) 
[-0.80] 
L1_ODI 
1.360 
(3.38)*** 
[2.43]** 
1.414 
(3.51)*** 
[2.53]** 
L1_M&A 
-0.141 
(-0.22) 
[-0.19] 
-0.153 
(-0.22) 
[-0.20] 
L1_PRIVATE 
-1.519 
(-1.45) 
[-2.35]** 
-1.568 
(-1.43) 
[-2.40]** 
L1_GERD 
8.283 
(0.96) 
[2.38]** 
8.753 
(0.95) 
[2.53]** 
CONSTANTS 
1.902 
(2.55)** 
[14.42]*** 
1.913 
(2.60)*** 
[14.57]*** 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1777.3 
27.13 
-2124.4 
26.34 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
Note: Bootstrapping t-statistics are in parentheses and t-statistics without bootstrapping 
appear in square brackets. The asterisks *** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Model 3 - Effects of Using Different R&D Data 
TRI_PATENT 
Fixed Effects 
(1) 
Random Effects 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Random Effects 
(4) 
L1_EXP 
1.608 
(1.87)* 
[3.87]*** 
1.638 
(1.87)* 
[3.89]*** 
1.444 
(1.44) 
[3.57]*** 
1.467 
(1.43) 
[3.57]*** 
L1_IM 
-0.264 
(-0.19) 
[-0.56] 
-0.377 
(-0.28) 
[-0.80] 
-0.183 
(-0.12) 
[-0.41] 
-0.291 
(-0.20) 
[-0.64] 
L1_ODI 
1.360 
(3.38)*** 
[2.43]** 
1.414 
(3.51)*** 
[2.53]** 
1.224 
(3.24)*** 
[2.20]** 
1.273 
(3.14)*** 
[2.29]** 
L1_M&A_SALE 
-0.141 
(-0.22) 
[-0.19] 
-0.153 
(-0.22) 
[-0.20] 
-0.206 
(-0.33) 
[-0.28] 
-0.217 
(-0.36) 
[-0.29] 
L1_PRIVATE 
-1.519 
(-1.45) 
[-2.35]** 
-1.568 
(-1.43) 
[-2.40]** 
-1.422 
(-1.43) 
[-2.20]** 
-1.467 
(-1.39) 
[-2.25]** 
L1_GERD 
8.283 
(0.96) 
[2.38]** 
8.753 
(0.95) 
[2.53]** 
 
 
 
 
L1_BERD 
 
 
 
 
13.720 
(1.09) 
[3.46]*** 
14.396 
(1.16) 
[3.66]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.902 
(2.55)** 
[14.42]*** 
1.913 
(2.60)*** 
[14.57]*** 
1.986 
(2.76)*** 
[15.89]*** 
1.999 
(2.77)*** 
[16.05]*** 
Log likelihood -1777.3 -2124.4 -1746.5 -2093.1 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
27.13 
0.000 
26.34 
0.000 
25.32 
0.000 
22.62 
0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
37 
399 
37 
399 
Note: Bootstrapping t-statistics are in parentheses and t-statistics without 
bootstrapping appear in square brackets. The asterisks *** and * denote significance 
at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Model 4 - Effects of Using Different Patent Data (under GERD) 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 
TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L1_EXP 
1.596 
(1.81)* 
[3.87]*** 
1.608 
(1.87)* 
[3.87]*** 
1.713 
(2.81)*** 
[4.33]*** 
1.758 
(2.88)*** 
[4.44]*** 
1.628 
(1.86)* 
[3.90]*** 
1.638 
(1.87)* 
[3.89]*** 
1.775 
(3.06)*** 
[4.42]*** 
1.818 
(2.89)*** 
[4.51]*** 
L1_IM 
-0.263 
(-0.19) 
[-0.56] 
-0.264 
(-0.19) 
[-0.56] 
-0.348 
(-0.28) 
[-0.79] 
-0.319 
(-0.27) 
[-0.72] 
-0.377 
(-0.28) 
[-0.80] 
-0.377 
(-0.28) 
[-0.80] 
-0.491 
(-0.45) 
[-1.09] 
-0.461 
(-0.42) 
[-1.02] 
L1_ODI 
1.465 
(3.73)*** 
[2.60]*** 
1.360 
(3.38)*** 
[2.43]** 
1.683 
(3.35)*** 
[2.81]*** 
1.503 
(3.39)*** 
[2.60]*** 
1.521 
(3.79)*** 
[2.69]*** 
1.414 
(3.51)*** 
[2.53]** 
1.780 
(3.78)*** 
[2.98]*** 
1.598 
(3.41)*** 
[2.76]*** 
L1_IDI 
-0.993 
(-1.46) 
[-1.81]* 
 
-0.247 
(-0.42) 
[-0.42] 
 
-1.023 
(-1.44) 
[-1.85]* 
 
-0.290 
(-0.49) 
[-0.49] 
 
L1_M&A_SALE  
-0.141 
(-0.22) 
[-0.19] 
 
1.485 
(2.04)** 
[1.97]** 
 
-0.153 
(-0.22) 
[-0.20] 
 
1.454 
(1.91)* 
[1.92]* 
L1_PRIVATE  
-1.519 
(-1.45) 
[-2.35]** 
 
-1.387 
(-1.79)* 
[-2.00]** 
 
-1.568 
(-1.43) 
[-2.40]** 
 
-1.451 
(-1.76)* 
[-2.07]** 
L1_GERD 
8.898 
(0.94) 
[2.60]*** 
8.283 
(0.96) 
[2.38]** 
19.215 
(2.25)** 
[5.72]*** 
18.013 
(2.12)** 
[5.26]*** 
9.362 
(1.05) 
[2.75]*** 
8.753 
(0.95) 
[2.53]** 
19.377 
(2.23)** 
[5.79]*** 
18.20 
(2.04)** 
[5.35]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.894 
(2.51)** 
[14.44]*** 
1.902 
(2.55)** 
[14.42]*** 
1.171 
(2.34)** 
[9.84]*** 
1.183 
(2.50)** 
[9.85]*** 
1.905 
(2.54)** 
[14.59]*** 
1.913 
(2.60)*** 
[14.57]*** 
1.193 
(2.69)*** 
[10.11]*** 
1.205 
(2.58)*** 
[10.11]*** 
Loglikelihood -1778.5 -1777.3 -2292.4 -2287.8 -2125.7 -2124.4 -2682.6 -2677.9 
Wald chi2 28.32 27.13 81.20 104.28 26.48 26.34 76.72 93.43 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
37 
399 
37 
403 
37 
403 
37 
403 
37 
403 
37 
403 
Note: Bootstrapping t-statistics are in parentheses and t-statistics without 
bootstrapping appear in square brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Model 4 - Effects of Using Different Patent Data (under BERD) 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 
TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L1_EXP 
1.440 
(1.38) 
[3.59]*** 
1.444 
(1.44) 
[3.57]*** 
1.770 
(2.85)*** 
[4.66]*** 
1.802 
(2.84)*** 
[4.74]*** 
1.465 
(1.41) 
[3.60]*** 
1.467 
(1.43) 
[3.57]*** 
1.824 
(2.70)*** 
[4.72]*** 
1.855 
(2.74)*** 
[4.79]*** 
L1_IM 
-0.191 
(-0.12) 
[-0.43] 
-0.183 
(-0.12) 
[-0.41] 
-0.481 
(-0.37) 
[-1.14] 
-0.438 
(-0.35) 
[-1.04] 
-0.30 
(-0.20) 
[-0.67] 
-0.291 
(-0.20) 
[-0.64] 
-0.615 
(-0.50) 
[-1.44] 
-0.572 
(-0.48) 
[-1.33] 
L1_ODI 
1.305 
(3.27)*** 
[2.33]** 
1.224 
(3.24)*** 
[2.20]** 
1.508 
(3.19)*** 
[2.55]** 
1.361 
(2.96)*** 
[2.38]** 
1.354 
(3.51)*** 
[2.41]** 
1.273 
(3.14)*** 
[2.29]** 
1.598 
(3.24)*** 
[2.71]*** 
1.448 
(3.15)*** 
[2.54]** 
L1_IDI 
-0.940 
(-1.46) 
[-1.73]* 
 
-0.159 
(-0.29) 
[-0.28] 
 
-0.966 
(-1.50) 
[-1.76]* 
 
-0.197 
(-0.36) 
[-0.34] 
 
L1_M&A_SALE  
-0.206 
(-0.33) 
[-0.28] 
 
1.423 
(1.87)* 
[1.94]* 
 
-0.217 
(-0.36) 
[-0.29] 
 
1.392 
(2.14)** 
[1.90]* 
L1_PRIVATE  
-1.422 
(-1.43) 
[-2.20]** 
 
-1.243 
(-1.80)* 
[-1.83]* 
 
-1.467 
(-1.39) 
[-2.25]** 
 
-1.30 
(-1.81)* 
[-1.90]* 
L1_BERD 
14.344 
(1.14) 
[3.67]*** 
13.720 
(1.09) 
[3.46]*** 
25.609 
(2.38)** 
[6.71]*** 
24.274 
(2.12)** 
[6.24]*** 
15.014 
(1.22) 
[3.88]*** 
14.396 
(1.16) 
[3.66]*** 
25.917 
(2.34)** 
[6.84]*** 
24.599 
(2.21)** 
[6.37]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.982 
(2.70)*** 
[15.96]*** 
1.986 
(2.76)*** 
[15.89]*** 
1.329 
(2.98)*** 
[12.18]*** 
1.331 
(2.94)*** 
[12.07]*** 
1.996 
(2.78)*** 
[16.12]*** 
1.999 
(2.77)*** 
[16.05]*** 
1.351 
(3.05)*** 
[12.47]*** 
1.353 
(3.17)*** 
[12.36]*** 
Log likelihood -1747.4 -1746.5 -2256.2 -2252.1 -2094.1 -2093.1 -2646.0 -2641.8 
Wald chi2 23.87 25.32 70.11 96.54 24.43 22.62 71.78 92.77 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
Note: Bootstrapping t-statistics are in parentheses and t-statistics without 
bootstrapping appear in square brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Global Outward Direct Investment 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
Figure 2. Global Exports 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 3. Global ODI & Exports to GDP Ratio 
 
Source: World Bank and UNCTAD 
